From the Fall of the Syrian Arab Republic to Genocide: Lessons for Central Asia

The Middle East is one of the most unstable regions in the world. Tensions are rising again with Iran, mainly from the United States and Israel. There is also some tension between Turkey and Iran. Due to various factors, Iran's relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia are very complicated. At the same time, following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19, 2025, everyone is talking about the growing destabilization in Turkey. In the last two years, the world’s attention has been riveted on the military operation in Palestine, which involved massive bombings and thousands of casualties by Israel. There was also an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, resulting in significant destruction. In December 2024, the Syrian Arab Republic fell. Instead of the secular, albeit harsh, regime of Bashar al-Assad, the jihadists took power in the form of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) movement, led by Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani. He was a former participant in the Iraq War on the side of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and one of the leaders of the Al-Qaeda branch in Syria, the Jabhat al-Nusra organization (all of these organizations are banned in many countries around the world).

In this article, I ask a very serious question: how did it happen that one unprogressive regime, which ruled for decades, was replaced by another, retrograde and brutal, if not bloody? What are the consequences of these changes for the people of Syria and neighboring states? I want to emphasize that what is happening in Syria should not be considered distant or irrelevant. There are many parallels between what is happening there and the processes in the post-Soviet space, including our region, Central Asia.

1. Why the Syrian Arab Republic Fell

Bashar al-Assad’s regime should be viewed in the context of the absence of any significant improvements in the living conditions of ordinary citizens, amid rampant corruption, lawlessness, and permissiveness toward those in power and the military. By the way, the military received a meager salary ranging from fifteen to fifty dollars a month.

According to many reports, living conditions in Syria in 2024 were much worse than during the active phase of the civil war (2012-2017), which certainly exacerbated social contradictions and the hatred of ordinary people toward the authorities.

Therefore, although Syria won the war with the help of Russia and Iran in 2017, the leadership lost the peace in 2024. As a result, it lost power in December 2024. The consequences for ordinary people are highly ambiguous.

The fall of power occurred because Syria did not undertake any significant modernization of the army, nor did it focus on economic development or meaningful political processes to reconcile the ethnic and religious conflicts that had accumulated over decades of Assad family rule, especially during the civil war.

Syria was torn apart not only by internal contradictions but also by the competing interests of regional and global powers. Turkey, for example, sought to reduce the influence and role of Syrian Kurdistan, which, while officially part of Syria, de facto operated as a self-governing territory with its own army and oil-based economy. The United States had interests in continuing oil production on one hand, and creating problems for Russia and Iran on the other. Israel always had its own interests, notably countering Iran’s influence and possibly expanding its territorial reach at the expense of Syria, including the Golan Heights, which it has controlled for many years.

Until December 2024, Syria’s main supporters were Iran and Russia, both of which exerted maximum efforts to stabilize the situation and strengthen Bashar al-Assad’s rule. However, gaining power is one thing; using it for the common good, reconciling all parties, and demonstrating the possibility of mutually beneficial coexistence and economic prosperity is a far more complex challenge.

Despite the support from Russia and Iran, Assad’s government failed in this second task. The Syrian authorities neglected the need to strengthen defense capabilities and improve the economic situation for the people. Despite internal threats, they completely ignored the lessons from the war in Ukraine. In contrast, various terrorist groups in Idlib province, which saw an influx of people displaced by the Assad regime, greatly improved their combat capabilities. This was due to superior equipment, weapons, and preparation for modern warfare, with support from Turkey (given the obvious contradictions between Assad and Turkey, as stated by Turkish authorities), possibly Israel, and according to several reports, Ukrainian special services or instructors. Training in new warfare methods, such as drone usage and coordination using satellite data and modern communication tools, appears to have played a major role in the rapid success of the opposition over the Syrian Arab Republic’s army. As a result, the Syrian authorities lost their advantage, and the so-called opposition in Idlib conducted a well-organized campaign with success that even surprised themselves and their sponsors.

Why did this happen? On one hand, in a “wild field,” the boldest tend to win. On the other hand, the connections of internationally known militants, the “heirs” of Al-Qaeda, facilitated easier financing from various private Islamic funds. Consequently, the relatively higher aggressiveness and financial resources greatly aided this particular group of the so-called Syrian opposition (HTS).

It is also worth mentioning that international and regional circumstances played a significant role in the regime’s fall. For example, the war in Ukraine, where Russian authorities were mainly focused, and the events in Lebanon, where Israel waged war against Hezbollah, led to the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters from Syria. Additionally, Iran’s decreasing activity in Syria, due to the threat of a potential conflict with Israel (backed by the U.S.), also contributed.

However, it should be noted that conversations with colleagues from the Middle East region have led me to believe that the probable bribery of high-ranking army officers also played a significant role. Many soldiers of the SAR army have noted in interviews that, despite their readiness to resist, they were ordered to dress as civilians, leave their weapons, and blend into the civilian population to “avoid civilian casualties.” Meanwhile, HTS claimed it would not harm civilians, fighting only against Assad’s army. This likely had a calming effect on many people amid the growing chaos.

Thus, the absence of a combat-ready army, which had not been significantly improved and had, in fact, been partially purged of strong officers over the past seven years of Assad’s “truce,” as well as the decline in popular support due to harsh economic realities, the failure of the political process, and significant international contradictions, led to the downfall of the Syrian Arab Republic. Unfortunately, this failure of the Syrian army and Assad’s regime did not come without consequences for the ordinary population. Despite promises made in November-December 2024 not to harm civilians, bloody events were inevitable.

2. Bloody Events in Latakia and Tartus

Of course, it is very difficult to obtain detailed and objective information from modern Syria, but many facts indicate that genocide against certain minorities has taken place or is still ongoing. In particular, the Alawites, represented by the former leader of the country, Bashar al-Assad, Christians, and Druze—an interesting religious group that, like Islam, recognizes all the prophets of the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), but believes in the transmigration of souls—are affected. While the Druze, due to their geographical location near the borders of Israel, are now under Israel's protection, the Alawites, squeezed between the mountains of Latakia and Tartus and the Mediterranean Sea, have no one to protect them. Consequently, there are videos and photographs online showing hundreds of people being shot, often after being tortured and beaten, many of whom are women and children.

In addition to the shootings in the settlements of Latakia and Tartus, forest fires have occurred in recent days. Some estimates suggest that these fires may be an attempt to destroy civilians hiding there from persecution. All of this is happening in the 21st century!

According to the most conservative estimates, at least a thousand people have already died, though many sources estimate the number of victims as more than 7,000, with some even suggesting more than 10,000. The official authorities, led by the de facto head of Syria and "President of Syria for the transitional period from January 29, 2025," Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani—who has been the leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) movement for several years—have created a commission to investigate the matter and promise to "conduct an objective investigation and punish the guilty." However, to be honest, it is hard to believe this will happen.

It is difficult, I believe, to turn from a radical Islamist into a humanist. Changing military camouflage into a secular suit doesn’t solve this. That being said, some argue that HTS would have preferred to keep its promise not to harm civilians, but unlike the situation in Idlib, where they could maintain full control over their fiefdom—even though its population reached three million—the situation in Syria, with a population of 24 million, is very different. Those same 30,000 fighters are clearly not enough. Additionally, other groups that have joined HTS do not fully comply with its orders and demands.

Perhaps it was precisely these groups, including those from Central Asia and the Caucasus, that provoked the conflict on the border between Syria and Lebanon in the second half of March 2025. This conflict grew from the "self-defense of Lebanese cattle breeders against cattle thieves from the neighboring Syrian 'Gulyaipole,'" during which, according to my Lebanese colleagues, "cattle breeders destroyed two cattle thieves' tanks," escalating into significant clashes between Syrian militants and Lebanese troops. Of course, the "fairy tale about cattle thieves" may be exaggerated, but this does not diminish the tension along the entire perimeter of the Syrian border, as well as within the conflict-torn country. After all, in addition to those who have joined the interim government in Syria, there are dozens of large and small groups that are "on their own," meaning they do not answer to anyone.

Nevertheless, it is clear that, given the severity of the situation with ethnic cleansing, for the first time in a long while, Russia and the United States jointly initiated closed consultations at the UN Security Council in the second half of March 2025 "in connection with violence against civilians in Western Syria." The results of the consultations were not made public. However, by the end of March, many media outlets reported that "the United States accused the interim government of Syria of killing civilians."

According to some sources published on Telegram channels, in response to the current situation, "Russian troops have begun deploying to cities surrounding the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia, in coastal Syria... Russian troops have taken control of Al-Qubaisiya, Bahdarmo, and Khirbet al-Ashar." The purpose of the deployment is allegedly to strengthen the security of the base and reduce pressure on the more than 7,000 Alawites who have taken refuge there.

Lessons for Kyrgyzstan and Central Asian Countries

It should be understood that, despite the significant geographical remoteness of Syria from the Central Asian region, in today’s globalized world, the Syrian crisis is not something distant or irrelevant to Kyrgyzstan or the region as a whole. After all, many people from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have gone to fight in Syria. For example, in 2019, the BBC reported: "Of the more than 4,000 people from Central Asia who went to war in Syria, at least 850 were from Kyrgyzstan." In December 2022, our State Committee for National Security reported that 734 Kyrgyz citizens had gone to Syria. How many of them are there now is unknown. Until 2021, the media reported that the "Katiba Tawhid wal-Jihad"—"Battalion of Monotheism and Jihad"—was fighting alongside HTS. It allegedly consisted of citizens from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

This "battalion" is known for carrying out a terrorist attack on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek in 2016, and a year later, for explosions at the Sennaya Ploshad and Technological Institute metro stations in St. Petersburg. However, in 2021, reports emerged that the "Katiba Tawhid wal-Jihad" had increased in size and been renamed "Liwa Abu Ubayd ibn-Jarrah" ("liwa" means "brigade"). Currently, the chief of staff of HTS is Sayfiddin Tadjiboev, a native of Tajikistan, who is wanted in his home country for terrorism.

The leadership of Kyrgyzstan, like other countries in the region, had to evacuate hundreds of women and children, the families of militants who had left for Syria.

By the way, according to some reports, many militants from Syria, after HTS's "victory," were sent to reinforce the Islamic State movement (ISIS or Daesh) in Afghanistan. This is now a serious concern on the outskirts of post-Soviet Central Asia, which poses a growing threat to the region.

Naturally, Tajikistan supports the Tajiks of Afghanistan, but this has irked the Taliban regime, which threatens to invade Tajikistan in retaliation for supporting opposition forces. This creates an additional threat to the region. A breakthrough by these forces into Tajikistan could have catastrophic consequences for all of Central Asia.

The experiences of the fall of the SAR, the wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan (where unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, were used extensively, including the AN-2 to overload Armenian air defense systems), the conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and especially the war in Ukraine, clearly demonstrate that technology—especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—plays a decisive role in military operations. The use of drones, including FPV drones and fiber-optic drones, significantly improves reconnaissance, coordination of actions, and the accuracy of strikes. This experience highlights the need for Central Asian countries to invest in modern defense technologies and develop relevant military units.

The experiences of Syria and Ukraine show that the modern geopolitical environment is characterized by rapid technological change and complex interstate contradictions. Several key conclusions for Kyrgyzstan and Central Asian countries can be drawn from these dynamics:

Threats to Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia

The main threats to the region are associated with possible external and internal challenges:

Military Challenges: Modern conflicts demonstrate that adversaries with advanced technology can quickly shift the balance of power. The threat of drones, electronic warfare, and satellite communications—especially in conflicts involving radical groups—is relevant for countries whose defenses have not yet been fully modernized.
Radical Islamic Groups: The risk of radicalization remains in Central Asia, exacerbated by economic difficulties and political instability. The timely introduction of modern technologies and effective cooperation between countries in the region will help mitigate this threat.
External Influence: The region may become a target for pressure from major powers seeking to exploit geopolitical tensions to achieve their own goals.

Policy Recommendations for Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia

Modernization of the Defense Sector:

Actively introduce electronic warfare systems, modern drones (including FPV drones and kamikaze drones), and satellite communications to enhance the operational effectiveness of the military.
Invest in training specialists in modern technologies, and organize regular training and experience exchanges with foreign partners.
The experiences from conflicts like the one between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as internal conflicts in the region, show that modern technologies can dramatically change the course of military operations.

Regional Cooperation and Resolution of Border Issues:

It is encouraging that Central Asian countries have successfully resolved border issues (such as the agreements between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). This provides a foundation for regional stability and enables countries to focus on common security tasks.

It is recommended to strengthen mechanisms for joint defense and information exchange among states in the region, as well as to actively cooperate with Russia, China, and other interested partners.

Social and Economic Policy and Development:

In addition to defense modernization, the countries of the region must pursue an active economic policy aimed at improving the standard of living, developing infrastructure, and diversifying the economy. Fortunately, this process has already begun in the region.

A balanced development of both the economy and defense sector will help create a sustainable foundation for stability and reduce the risk of internal conflicts and radicalization.

Examples of Successful Technology Implementation:

There is a growing understanding in the region of the need to improve technology. This can be observed in the armies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have already started integrating modern technologies at a deeper level, creating specialized units equipped with electronic warfare systems, modern drones, and satellite communications. This experience can serve as a model for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, demonstrating that timely modernization of the armed forces is essential for effective defense and security in the region.

Thus, for Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries, the lessons from Syria and other modern conflicts are clear: it is not only necessary to modernize the military using advanced technologies but also to actively develop the economy and strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries and strategic partners. Such a comprehensive policy will help create conditions for sustainable development, minimize risks of external and internal destabilization, and ensure peace and the well-being of the population in the region.

Fortunately, much of what is outlined in these recommendations is already being implemented both at the level of individual states and within the framework of intra-regional cooperation, as well as at the international level. For example, strong ties have been established with Russia, China, the European Union (the Central Asia-EU summit was held last week), Turkey, India, and Iran. Interaction with Afghanistan is also improving, and the countries in the region are reviewing their economic strategies. All of this can lead to stability and the progressive development of the region.

Sincerely,

Bakhtiyar Igamberdiev
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Doctoral Student in Economics at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University

Author of the book Economic Policy of Kyrgyzstan 1991-2010: Experience and Results
Graduate of the Master’s Program at the Institute of European Politics (Berlin)
Graduate of Scholarship Programs at George Mason University and Indiana University, USA
Graduate of Issyk-Kul State University named after K. Tynystanov